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Abstract
Crowdsourcing is now widely used to replace judgement or evaluation by an expert authority with
an aggregate evaluation from a number of non-experts, in applications ranging from rating and catego-
rizing online content all the way to evaluation of student assignments in massively open online courses
(MOOCs) via peer grading. A key issue in these settings, where direct monitoring of both effort and
accuracy is infeasible, is incentivizing agents in the ‘crowd’ to put in effort to make good evaluations, as
well as to truthfully report their evaluations. We study the design of mechanisms for crowdsourced judge-
ment elicitation when workers strategically choose both their reports and the effort they put into their
evaluations. This leads to a new family of information elicitation problems with unobservable ground
truth, where an agent’s proficiency— the probability with which she correctly evaluates the underlying
ground truth— is endogenously determined by her strategic choice of how much effort to put into the
task.
Our main contribution is a simple, new, mechanism for binary information elicitation for multiple
tasks when agents have endogenous proficiencies, with the following properties: (i) Exerting maximum
effort followed by truthful reporting of observations is a Nash equilibrium. (ii) This is the equilibrium
with maximum payoff to all agents, even when agents have different maximum proficiencies, can use
mixed strategies, and can choose a different strategy for each of their tasks. Our information elicitation
mechanism requires only minimal bounds on the priors, asks agents to only report their own evaluations,
and does not require any conditions on a diverging number of agent reports per task to achieve its
incentive properties. The main idea behind our mechanism is to use the presence of multiple tasks and
ratings to estimate a reporting statistic to identify and penalize low-effort agreement— the mechanism
rewards agents for agreeing with another ‘reference’ agent report on the same task but also penalizes for
blind agreement by subtracting out this statistic term, designed so that agents obtain rewards only when
they put in effort into their observations.
1 Introduction
Crowdsourcing, where a problem or task is broadcast to a crowd of potential participants for solution, is used
for an increasingly wide variety of tasks on the Web. One particularly common application of crowdsourcing
is in the context of making evaluations, or judgements— when the number of evaluations required is too
large for a single expert, a solution is to replace the expert by an evaluation aggregated from a ‘crowd’
recruited on an online crowdsourcing platform such as Amazon Mechanical Turk. Crowdsourced judgement
elicitation is now used for a number of applications such as image classification and labeling, judging the
quality of online content, identifying abusive or adult content, and most recently for peer grading in online
education, where Massively Open Online Courses (MOOCs) with enrollment in the hundreds of thousands
crowdsource the problem of evaluating assignments submitted by students back to the class itself. While one
issue in the context of crowdsourcing evaluations is how best to aggregate the evaluations obtained from the
crowd, there is also a key question of eliciting the best possible evaluations from the crowd in the first place.
The problem of designing incentive mechanisms for such crowdsourced judgement elicitation scenarios
has two aspects. First, suppose each worker has already evaluated, or formed a judgement on, the tasks
allocated to her. Since the ‘ground truth’ for each task is unknown to the system, a natural solution is to
reward workers based on other workers’ reports for the same task (this being the only available source of
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information about this ground truth)1. The problem of designing rewards to incentivize agents to truthfully
report their observation, rather than, for example, a report that is more likely to agree with other agents’
reports, is an information elicitation problem with unobservable ground truth. Information elicitation has
been recently been addressed in the literature in the context of eliciting opinions online (such as user opinions
about products, or experiences with service providers); see §1.1. However, in those settings, agents (users)
have already formed an opinion after receiving their signal (for example a user who buys a product forms
an opinion about it after buying it)— so agents only need to be incentivized to incur the cost to report this
opinion and find it more profitable to report their opinions truthfully than to report a different opinion.
In the crowdsourcing settings we consider, however, the user does not have such a pre-formed, or expe-
riential, opinion anyway, but rather forms a judgement as part of her task— further, the accuracy of this
judgement depends on whether or not the agent puts in effort into it (for instance, a worker evaluating
whether images contain objectionable content could put in no effort and declare all images to be clean, or
put in effort into identifying which images are actually appropriate; a similar choice applies in other contexts
like peer-grading). A key issue in these crowdsourced judgement elicitation scenarios is therefore incentiviz-
ing effort2— that is, ensuring that agents make the best judgements that they possibly can (in addition, of
course, to ensuring that they then truthfully report this observation). This leads to a new kind of informa-
tion elicitation problem where an agent’s proficiency now depends on her effort choice, and so is endogenous
and unknown to the system— even if an agent’s maximum proficiency is known, the actual proficiency with
which she performs a task is an endogenous, strategic choice and therefore cannot be assumed as fixed or
given.
A mechanism for information elicitation in this setting should make it ‘most beneficial’, if not the only
beneficial strategy, for agents to not just report their observations truthfully, but to also make the best
observations they can in the first place. Also, it is even more important now to ensure that the payoffs from
all agents always blindly reporting the same observation (for instance, declaring all content to be good) are
strictly smaller than the payoffs from truthfully reporting what was actually observed, since declaring all
tasks to be of some predecided type requires no effort and therefore incurs no cost, whereas actually putting
in effort into making observations will incur a nonzero cost. Finally, unlike mechanisms designed for settings
where a large audience is being polled for its opinion about a single event, a mechanism here must retain its
incentive properties even when there are only a few reports per task— this is because it can be infeasible,
due to either monetary or effort constraints, to solicit reports from a large number of agents for each task.
(For example, the number of tasks in peer grading scales linearly with the number of agents, limiting the
number of reports available for each task since each student can only grade a few assignments; similarly, the
total cost to the requester in crowdsourcing platforms such as Amazon Mechanical Turk scales linearly with
the number of workers reporting on each task). How can we elicit the best possible evaluations from agents
whose proficiency of evaluation depends on their strategically chosen effort, when the ground truth as well
as the effort levels of agents are unobservable to the mechanism?
Our Contributions. We introduce a model for information elicitation with endogenous proficiency, where
an agent’s strategic choice of whether or not to put in effort into a task endogenously determines her pro-
ficiency (the probability of correctly evaluating the ground truth) for that task. We focus on the design
of mechanisms for binary information elicitation, i.e., when the underlying ground truth is binary (corre-
sponding to eliciting ‘good’ or ‘bad’ ratings). While generalizing to an arbitrary underlying type space is an
immediate direction for further work, we note that a number of interesting judgement and evaluation tasks,
for example identifying adult content or correctness evaluation, are indeed binary; also, even very recent
literature providing improved mechanisms for information elicitation (e.g. [?, ?]), as well as experimental
work on the performance of elicitation mechanisms [?, ?], focuses on models with binary ground truth.
Our main contribution is a simple, new, mechanism for binary information elicitation for multiple tasks
1It is of course infeasible for a requester to monitor every worker’s performance on her task, since this would be a problem
of the same scale as simply performing all the tasks herself. We also note that a naive approach of randomly checking some
subset of evaluations, either via inserting tasks with known responses, or via random checking by the requester, turns out to
be very wasteful of effort at the scale neccessary to achieve the right incentives.
2We thank David Evans (VP Education, Udacity) for pointing out this issue in the context of peer-grading applications—
while students might put in their best efforts on grading screening assignments to ensure they demonstrate the minimum
proficiency required to be allowed to grade, how can we be sure that they will continue to work with the same proficiency when
grading homeworks outside of this screening set?
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when agents have endogenous proficiencies. Our mechanism has the following incentive properties.
(i) Exerting maximum effort followed by truthful reporting of observations is a Nash equilibrium.
(ii) This is the equilibrium with maximum payoff to all agents, even when agents have different maximum
proficiencies, can use mixed strategies, and can choose a different strategy for each of their tasks.
Showing that full-effort truthtelling leads to the maximum reward amongst all equilibria (including
those involving mixed strategies) requires arguing about the rewards to agents in all possible equilibria
that may arise. To do this, we use a matrix representation of strategies where every strategy can
be written as a convex combination of ‘basis’ strategies, so that maximizing a function over the set
of all possible strategies is equivalent to a maximization over the space of coefficients in this convex
combination. This representation lets us show that the reward to an agent over all possible strategy
choices (by herself and other agents), and therefore over all equilibria, is maximized when all agents
use the strategy of full-effort truthful reporting.
(iii) Suppose there is some positive probability, however small, that there is some ‘trusted’ agent for each
task who will report on that task truthfully with proficiency greater than half. Then the equilib-
rium where all agents put in full effort and report truthfully on all their tasks is essentially the only
equilibrium of our mechanism, even if the mechanism does not know the identity of the trusted agents.
We note that our mechanism requires only minimal bounds on the priors and imposes no conditions on a
diverging number of agent reports per task to achieve its incentive properties— to the best of our knowledge,
previous mechanisms for information elicitation do not provide all these guarantees simultaneously, even
when proficiency is not an endogenously determined choice (see §1.1 for a discussion).
The main idea behind our mechanismM is the following. With just one task, it is difficult to distinguish
between agreement arising from high-effort observations of the same ground truth, and ‘blind’ agreement
achieved by the low-effort strategy of always making the same report. We use the presence of multiple
tasks and ratings to distinguish between these two scenarios and appropriately reward or penalize agents to
incentivize high effort— M rewards an agent i for her report on task j for agreeing with another ‘reference’
agent rj(i)’s report on the same task, but also penalizes for blind agreement by subtracting out a statistic
term corresponding to the part of i and rj(i)’s agreement on task j that is to be ‘expected anyway’ given
their reporting statistics estimated from other tasks. This statistic term is chosen so that there is no benefit
to making reports that are independent of the ground truth; the incentive properties of the mechanism follow
from this property that agents obtain positive rewards only when they put effort into their evaluations.
1.1 Related Work
The problem of designing incentives for crowdsourced judgement elicitation is closely related to the growing
literature on information elicitation mechanisms. The key difference between this literature (discussed in
greater detail below) and our work is that agents in the settings motivating past work have opinions that
are experientially formed anyway— independent, and outside of, any mechanisms to elicit opinions— so that
agents only need be incentivized to participate and truthfully report these opinions. In contrast, agents in
the crowdsourcing settings we study do not have such experientially formed opinions to report— an agent
makes a judgement only because it is part of her task, expending effort to form her judgement, and therefore
must be incentivized to both expend this effort and then to truthfully report her evaluation. There are also
other differences in terms of the models and guarantees in previous mechanisms for information elicitation;
we discuss this literature below.
The peer-prediction method, introduced by Miller, Resnick and Zeckhauser [?], is a mechanism for the
information elicitation problem for general outcome spaces where truthful reporting is a Nash equilibrium,
uses proper scoring rules to reward agents for reports that are predictive of other agents’ reports. The
main difference between our mechanism and [?], as well as other mechanisms based on the peer prediction
method [?, ?, ?, ?, ?], is in the model of agent proficiency. In peer-prediction models, while agents can
decide whether to incur the cost to participate (i.e., submit their opinion), an agent’s proficiency— the
distribution of opinions or evaluations conditional on ground truth— is exogenously determined (and common
to all agents, and in most models, known to the center). That is, an agent might not participate at all,
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but if she does participate she is assumed to have some known proficiency. In contrast, in our setting,
agents can choose not just whether or not to participate, but also endogenously determine their proficiency
conditional on participating through their effort choice. Thus, while peer prediction mechanisms do need
to incentivize agents to participate (by submitting a report), they then know the proficiency of agents
who do submit a report, and therefore can, and do, dispense rewards that crucially use knowledge of this
proficiency. In contrast, even agents who do submit reports in our setting cannot be assumed to be using their
maximum proficiency to make their evaluations, and therefore cannot be rewarded based on any assumed
level of proficiency. Additionally, truthtelling, while an equilibrium, is not necessarily the maximum-reward
equilibrium in these existing peer-prediction mechanisms— [?] shows that for the mechanisms in [?, ?], the
strategies of always reporting ‘good’ or always reporting ‘bad’ both constitute Nash equilibria, at least one of
which generates higher payoff than truthtelling. Such blind strategy equilibria can be eliminated and honest
reporting made the unique Nash equilibrium by designing the payments as in [?], but this needs agents to be
restricted to pure reporting strategies, and requires full knowledge of the prior and conditional probability
distributions to compute the rewards.
The Bayesian Truth Serum (BTS) [?] is another mechanism for information elicitation with unobservable
ground truth. BTS does not use the knowledge of a common prior to compute rewards, but rather collects
two reports from each agent— an ‘information’ report which is the agent’s own observation, as well as a
‘prediction’ report which is the agent’s prediction about the distribution of information reports from the
population— and uses these to compute rewards such that truthful reporting is the highest-reward Nash
equilibrium of the BTS mechanism. In addition to the key difference of exogenous versus endogenous
proficiencies discussed above, an important limitation of BTS in the crowdsourcing setting is that it requires
the number of agents n reporting on a task to diverge to ensure its incentive properties. This n → ∞
requirement is infeasible in our setting due to the scaling of cost with number of reports as discussed in the
introduction. [?] provides a robust BTS mechanism (RBTS) that works even for small populations (again
in the same non-endogenous proficiency model as BTS and peer prediction mechanisms), and also ensures
payments are positive, making the mechanism ex-post individually rational in contrast to BTS. However, the
RBTS mechanism does not retain the property of truthtelling being the highest reward Nash equilibrium—
indeed, the ‘blind agreement’ equilibrium via constant reports achieves the maximum possible reward in
RBTS, whereas truthtelling might in fact lead to lower rewards.
There is also work on information elicitation in conducting surveys and online polling [?, ?], both of
which are not quite appropriate for our crowdsourcing setting. The mechanism in [?] is weakly incentive
compatible (agents are indifferent between lying and truthtelling), while [?] presents a online mechanism
that is not incentive compatible in the sense that we use and potentially requires a large (constant) number
of agents to converge to the true result. For other work on information elicitation, albeit in settings very
different from ours, see [?, ?, ?].
We note also that we model settings where there is indeed a notion of a ground truth, albeit unobservable,
so that proficient agents who put in effort are more likely than not to correctly observe this ground truth.
Peer-prediction methods, as well as the Bayesian truth serum, are designed for settings where there may be
no underlying ground truth at all, and the mechanism only seeks to elicit agents’ true observations (whatever
they are) which means that some agents might well be in the minority even when they truthfully report
their observation— this makes the peer prediction setting ‘harder’ along the dimension of inducing truthful
reports, but easier along the dimension of not needing to incentivize agents to choose to exert effort to make
high-proficiency observations.
We note that our problem can also be cast as a version of a principal-agent problem with a very large
number of agents, although the principal cannot directly observe an agent’s ‘output’ as in standard models.
While there is a vast literature in economics on the principal-agent problem too large to describe here (see,
eg, [?] and references therein), none of this literature, to the best of our knowledge, addresses our problem.
Finally, there is also a large orthogonal body of work on the problem of learning unknown (but exogenous)
agent proficiencies, as well as on the problem of optimally combining reports from agents with differing
proficiencies to come up with the best aggregate evaluation in various models and settings. These problems
of learning exogenous agent proficiencies and optimally aggregating agent reports are orthogonal to our
problem of providing incentives to agents with endogenous, effort-dependent proficiencies to elicit the best
possible evaluations from them.
4
2 Model
We now present a simple abstraction of the problem of designing mechanisms for crowdsourced judgement
elicitation settings where agents’ proficiencies are determined by strategic effort choice.
Tasks. There are m tasks, or objects, j = 1, . . . ,m, where each task has some underlying ‘true quality’,
or type, X¯j. This true type X¯j is unknown to the system. We assume that the types are binary-valued: X¯j
is either H (or 1, corresponding to high-quality) or L (or 0, for low quality) for all j; we use 1 and H (resp.
0 and L) interchangeably throughout for convenience. The prior probabilities of H and L for all tasks are
denoted by P [H ] and P [L]. We assume throughout that max(P [H ],P [L]) < 1, i.e., that there is at least
some uncertainty in the underlying qualities of the objects.
Agents. There are n workers or agents i = 1, . . . , n who noisily evaluate, or form judgements on, the
qualities of objects. We say agent i performs task j if i evaluates object j. Agent i’s judgement on task j is
denoted by Xˆij ∈ {0, 1}, where Xˆij is 0 if i evaluates j to be of type L and Xˆij is 1 if i evaluates it to be
H . Having made an evaluation Xˆij , an agent can choose to report any value Xij ∈ {0, 1} either based on,
or independent of, her actual evaluation Xˆij .
We denote the set of tasks performed by an agent i by J(i), and let I(j) denote the set of agents who
perform task j. We will assume for notational simplicity that |J(i)| = D and |I(j)| = T for all agents i and
tasks j.
Proficiency. An agent’s proficiency at a task is the probability with which she correctly evaluates its true
type or quality. We assume that an agent’s proficiency is an increasing function of the effort she puts into
making her evaluation. Let eij denote agent i’s effort level for task j: we assume for simplicity that effort
is binary-valued, eij ∈ {0, 1}. Putting in 0 effort has cost cij(0) = 0, whereas putting in full effort has cost
cij(1) ≥ 0 (we note that our results also extend to a linear model with continuous effort where eij ∈ [0, 1]
and the probability pi(eij) of correctly observing X¯j as well as the cost ci(eij) increase linearly with eij).
An agent who puts in zero effort makes evaluations with proficiency pij(0) = 1/2 and does no better
than random guessing, i.e., Pr(Xˆij = X¯j |eij = 0) = 1/2. An agent who puts in full effort eij = 1 attains
her maximum proficiency, Pr(Xˆij = X¯j |eij = 1) = pij(1) = pi. Note that this maximum proficiency
pi can be different for individual agents modeling their different abilities, and need not be known to the
center. We assume that the maximum proficiency pi ≥
1
2 for all i— this minimum requirement on agent
ability can be ensured in online crowdsourcing settings by prescreening workers on a representative set of
tasks (Amazon Mechanical Turk, for instance, offers the ability to prescreen workers [?, ?], whereas in peer-
grading applications such as on Coursera, students are given a set of pre-graded assignments to measure
their grading abilities prior to grading their peers, the results of which can be used as a prescreen.)
We note that our results also extend easily to the case where the maximum proficiency of an agent depends
on whether the object is of type H or L, i.e., the probabilities of correctly observing the ground truth when
putting in full effort are different for different ground truths, Pr(Xˆij = X¯j|X¯j = H) 6= Pr(Xˆij = X¯j |X¯j = L)
(of course, different agents can continue to have different maximum proficiences).
Strategies. Agents strategically choose both their effort levels and reports on each task to maximize their
total utility, which is the difference between the reward received for their reports and the cost incurred in
making evaluations. Formally, an agent i’s strategy is a vector of D tuples [(eij , fij)], specifying her effort
level eij as well as the function fij she uses to map her actual evaluation Xˆij into her report Xij for each of
her tasks. Note that since an agent’s proficiency on a task pij is a function of her strategically chosen effort
eij , the proficiency of agent i for task j is endogenous in our model.
For a single task, we use the notation (1, X) to denote the choice of full effort eij = 1 and truthfully
reporting one’s evaluation (i.e., fij is the identity function Xij = Xˆij), (1, X
c) to denote full effort followed
by inverting one’s evaluation, and (0, r) to denote the choice of exerting no effort (eij = 0) and simply
reporting the outcome of a random coin toss with probability r of returning H . We use [(1, X)] to denote
the strategy of using full effort and truthtelling on all of an agent’s tasks, and similarly [(1, Xc)] and [(0, r)]
for the other strategies.
Mechanisms. A mechanism in this setting takes as input the set of all received reports Xij and computes
a reward for each agent based on her reports, as well as possibly the reports of other agents. Note that
the mechanism has no access3 to the underlying true qualities X¯j for any task, and so cannot use the X¯j
3Crowdsourcing is used typically precisely in scenarios where the number of tasks is too large for the principal (or a set of
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to determine agents’ rewards. A set of effort levels and reporting functions [(eij , fij)] is a full-information
Nash equilibrium of a mechanism if no agent i can strictly improve her expected utility by choosing either
a different effort level eˆij , or a different function fˆij to map her evaluation Xˆij into her report Xij . Here,
the expectation is over the randomness in agents’ noisy evaluation of the underlying ground truth, as well
as any randomness in the mechanism.
We will be interested in designing mechanisms for which it is (i) an equilibrium for all agents to put in
full effort and report their evaluations truthfully on all tasks, i.e., use strategies [(1, X)], and (ii) for which
[(1, X)] is the maximum utility (if not unique) equilibrium. We emphasize here that we do not address
the problem of how to optimally aggregate the T reports Xij for task j into a final estimate of X¯j: this
is an orthogonal problem requiring application-specific modeling; our only goal is to elicit the best possible
judgements to aggregate, by ensuring that agents find it most profitable to put in maximum effort into their
evaluations and then report these evaluations truthfully.
3 Mechanism
The main idea behind our mechanism M is following. Recall that a mechanism does not have access to the
true qualities X¯j, and therefore must compute rewards for agents that do not rely on directly observing X¯j .
Since the only source of information about X¯j comes from the reports Xij , a natural solution is to reward
based on some form of agreement between different agents reporting on j, similar to the peer-prediction
setting [?]. However, an easy way for agents to achieve perfect agreement with no effort is to always report
H (or L). With just one task, it is difficult for a mechanism to distinguish between the scenario where agents
achieve agreement by making accurate, high-effort, evaluations of the same ground truth, and the low-effort
scenario where agents achieve agreement by always reporting H , especially if P [H ] is high. However, in our
setting, we have the benefit of multiple tasks and ratings, which could potentially be used to distinguish
between these two strategies and appropriately reward agents to incentivize high effort.
M uses the presence of multiple ratings to subtract out a statistic term Bij from the agreement score,
chosen so that there is no benefit to making reports that are independent of X¯j— roughly speaking, M
rewards an agent i for her report on task j for agreeing with another ‘reference’ agent rj(i)’s report on the
same task, but only beyond what would be expected if i and rj(i) were randomly tossing coins with their
respective empirical frequencies of heads.
Let d denote the number of other reports made by i and rj(i) that are used in the computation of this
statistic term Bij based on the observed frequency of heads for each pair (i, j). We use Md to denote the
version ofM which uses d other reports from each of i and rj(i) to compute Bij . To completely specifyMd,
we also need to specify a reference rater rj(i) as well as this set of d (non-overlapping) tasks performed by i
and rj(i), for which we use the following notation. (We require these d other tasks to be non-overlapping so
that the reports for these tasks Xik and Xrj(i)l are independent
4, which is necessary to achieve the incentive
properties of Md.)
Definition 1 (Sij , Srj(i)j). Consider agent i and task j ∈ J(i), and a reference rater rj(i). Given a value
of d (1 ≤ d ≤ D − 1), let Sij and Srj(i)j be sets of d non-overlapping tasks other than task j performed by i
and rj(i) respectively, i.e.,
Sij ⊆ J(i) \ j, Srj(i)j ⊆ J(rj(i)) \ j, Sij ∩ Srj(i)j = ∅, |Sij | = |Srj(i)j | = d.
A mechanism Md is completely specified by reference raters rj(i) and the sets Sij and Srj(i)j , and
rewards agents as defined below. Note that Md only uses agents’ reports Xij to compute rewards and not
their maximum proficiencies pi, which therefore need not be known to the system.
trusted agents chosen by the principal) to carry out herself, so it is at best feasible to verify the ground truth for a tiny fraction
of all tasks, which fraction turns out to be inadequate (a formal statement is omitted here) to incentivize effort using knowledge
of the X¯j .
4We assume that co-raters’ identities are kept unknown to agents, so there is no collusion between i and rj(i).
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Definition 2 (Mechanism Md). Md computes an agent i’s reward for her report Xij ∈ {0, 1} on task j,
Rij , by comparing against a ‘reference rater’ rj(i)’s report Xrj(i)j for j, as follows:
Rij = Aij −Bij , where (1)
Aij = XijXrj(i)j + (1 −Xij)(1 −Xrj(i)j), and
Bij = (
∑
k∈Sij
Xik
d
)(
∑
l∈Srj(i)j
Xrj(i)l
d
) + (1 −
∑
k∈Sij
Xik
d
)(1−
∑
l∈Srj(i)j
Xrj(i)l
d
), (2)
where the sets Sij and Srj(i)j in Bij are as in Definition 1. The final reward to an agent i is βRi, where
Ri =
∑
j∈J(i) Rij and β is simply a non-negative scaling parameter that is chosen based on agents’ costs of
effort.
The first term, Aij , in Rij is an ‘agreement’ reward, and is 1 when i and rj(i) both agree on their report,
i.e., when Xij = Xrj(i)j = 1 or when Xij = Xrj(i)j = 0. The second term Bij is the ‘statistic’ term which,
roughly speaking, deducts from the agreement reward whatever part of i and rj(i)’s agreement on task j is to
be ‘expected anyway’ given their reporting statistics, i.e., the relative frequencies with which they report H
and L. This deduction is what givesM its nice incentive properties— whileM rewards agents for agreement
via Aij , M also penalizes for blind agreement that agents achieve without effort, by subtracting out the Bij
term corresponding to the expected frequency of agreement if i and rj(i) were randomly choosing reports
corresponding to their estimated means.
For example, suppose all agents were to always report H . Then Aij is always 1, but Bij = 1 as well so
that the net reward is 0; similarly if agents chose their reports according to a random cointoss, even one
with the ‘correct’ bias P [H ], the value of Aij is exactly equal to Bij since there is no correlation between
the reports for a particular task, again leading to a reward of 0. The reward function Rij is designed so that
it only rewards agents when they put in effort into their evaluations, which leads to the desirable incentive
properties ofMd. (We note that there are other natural statistics which might incentivize agents away from
low-effort reports— e.g., rewarding reports which collectively have an empirical mean close to P [H ], or for
variance. However, it turns out that appropriately balancing the agreement term (which is necessary to
ensure agents cannot simply report according to a cointoss with bias P [H ]) with a term penalizing blind
agreement to simultaneously ensure that [(1, X)] is an equilibrium and the most desirable equilibrium is hard
to accomplish.)
There are two natural choices for the parameter d, i.e., how many reports of i and rj(i) to include
for estimating the statistic term that we subtract from the agreement score in Rij
5. (i) In MD−1, we set
d = D − 1 and include all reports of agents i and rj(i), except those on their common task j. Here, the
non-overlap requirement for sets Sij and Srj(i)j says that an agent i and her reference rater rj(i) for task
j have only that task j in common. (ii) In M1, we set d = 1, i.e., subtract away the correlation between
the report of i and rj(i) on exactly one other non-overlapping task. In M1, the non-overlap condition only
requires that for each agent-task pair, there is a reference agent rj(i) available who has rated one other task
that is different from the remaining tasks rated by i, a condition that is much easier to satisfy than that in
MD−1. In § 4, we will see that M1 will require that the choices of (j, j
′), where {j′} = Sij is the task used
in the statistic term of i’s reward for task j, are such that each task j′ performed by i is used exactly once
to determine Rij for j 6= j′. Note that this is always feasible, for instance by using task j +1 in the statistic
term for task j for j = 1, . . . , D − 1 and task 1 for task D.
4 Analyzing M
In this section, we analyze equilibrium behavior in Md. We begin with some notation and preliminaries.
4.1 Preliminaries
Recall that proficiency is the probability of correctly evaluating the true quality. We use p[H ] (respectively
p[L]) to denote the probability that an agent observes H (respectively L) when making evaluations with
5Understanding the effect of the parameter d in our mechanisms, which appears irrelevant to the mechanism’s behavior when
agents are risk-neutral, is an interesting open question.
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proficiency p, i.e., the probability that Xˆij = H is p[H ] = pP [H ] + (1 − p)P [L]. Similarly, q[H ], q[L] and
pi[H ], pi[L] correspond to the probabilities of seeing H and L when making evaluations with proficiencies q
and pi respectively.
Matrix representation of strategies. We will frequently need to consider the space of all possible strategies an
agent may use in the equilibrium analysis of Md. While the choice of effort level eij in an agent’s strategy
[(eij , fij)] is easily described— there are only two possible effort levels 1 and 0— the space of functions fij
through which an agent can map her evaluation Xˆij into her report Xij is much larger. For instance, an
agent could choose fij corresponding to making an evaluation, performing a Bayesian update of her prior
on X¯j , and choosing the report with the higher posterior probability. We now discuss a way to represent
strategies that will allow us to easily describe the set of all reporting functions fij .
An agent i’s evaluation Xˆij can also be written as a two-dimensional vector o
ij ∈ R2, where oij =
[
1 0
]T
if i observes a H , and oij =
[
0 1
]T
if i observes a L, where aT denotes the transpose of a. For the purpose
of analyzing Md, any choice of reporting function fij can then be described via a 2× 2 matrix
M ij =
[
x 1− y
1− x y
]
,
where x is the probability with which i chooses to report H after observing H , i.e., x = Pr(Xij = H |Xˆij =
H), and similarly y = Pr(Xij = L|Xˆij = L). Observe that the choice of effort eij affects only oij and its
‘correctness’, or correlation with the (vector representing the) actual quality X¯j , and the choice of reporting
function fij only affects M
ij .
Any reporting matrix M ij of the form above can be written as a convex combination of four matrices—
one for each of the fij corresponding to (i) truthful reporting (Xij = Xˆij) (ii) inverting (Xij = Xˆ
c
ij), and
(iii, iv) always reporting H or L independent of one’s evaluation (Xij = H and Xij = L respectively):
MX =
[
1 0
0 1
]
,MXc =
[
0 1
1 0
]
,MH =
[
1 1
0 0
]
,ML =
[
0 0
1 1
]
.
That is, M ij = α1MX +α2MXc +α3MH +α4ML, where α1 = x−α3, α2 = 1− y−α3, and α3 = x− y and
α4 = 0 if x ≥ y, and α3 = 0 and α4 = y − x if y > x. It is easily verified that αi ≥ 0, and
∑
αi = 1, so that
this is a convex combination. Since all possible reporting strategies fij can be described by appropriately
choosing the values of x ∈ [0, 1] and y ∈ [0, 1] in M ij , every reporting function fij can be written as a convex
combination of these four matrices.
The agent’s final report Xij is then described by the vector M
ijoij ∈ R2, where the first entry is the
probability that i reports H , i.e., Xij = H , and the second entry is the probability that she reports Xij = L.
The expected reward of agent i for task j can therefore be written using the matrix-vector representation
(where T denotes transpose and 1 is the vector of all ones) as
E[Rij ] = E[(M
rj(i)jorj(i)j)TM ijoij + (1−M rj(i)jorj(i)j)T (1−M ijoij)]
− [(M rj(i)jE[orj(i)j ])TM ijE[oij ] + (1−M rj(i)jE[orj(i)j ])T (1−M ijE[oij ])],
which is linear inM ij . So the payoff from an arbitrary reporting function fij can be written as the corre-
sponding linear combination of the payoffs from each of the ‘basis’ functions (corresponding toMX ,MXc ,MH
and ML) constituting fij = M
ij . We will use this to argue that it is adequate to consider deviations to each
of the remaining basis reporting functions and show that they yield strictly lower reward to establish that
[(1, X)] is an equilibrium of Md.
Equivalent strategies. For the equilibrium analysis, we will use the following simple facts. (i) The strategy
(0, X) (i.e., using zero effort but truthfully reporting one’s evaluation) is equivalent to the strategy (0, r)
with r = 1/2, i.e., to the strategy of putting in no effort, and randomly reporting H or L independent of the
evaluation Xˆij with probability 1/2 each. (ii) The strategy (1, r) is equivalent to the strategy (0, r), since
the report Xij in both cases is completely independent of the evaluation Xˆij and therefore of eij .
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Cost of effort. While agents do incur a higher cost when using eij = 1 as compared to eij = 0, we will not
need to explicitly deal with the cost in the equilibrium analysis— if the reward from using a strategy where
eij = 1 is strictly greater than the reward from any strategy with eij = 0, the rewards Rij can always be
scaled appropriately using the factor β (in Definition 2) to ensure that the net utility (reward minus cost) is
strictly greater as well.
We remark here that bounds on this scaling factor β could be estimated empirically without requiring
knowledge of the priors by estimating the cost of effort cij from the maximum proficiencies obtained from a
pre-screening (§2), by conducting a series of trials with increasing rewards and then using individual ratio-
nality to estimate the cost of effort from observed proficiencies in these trials.
Individual rationality and non-negativity of payments. The expected payments made by our mech-
anism to each agent are always nonnegative in the full-effort truthful reporting equilibrium, i.e., when all
agents use strategies [(1, X)]. To ensure that the payments are also non-negative for every instance (of the
tasks and reports) and not only in expectation, note that it suffices to add 1 to the payments currently
specified, since the penalty term Bij in the reward Rij is bounded above by 1. We also note that individual
rationality can be achieved by using a value of β large enough to ensure that the net utility βRij − c(1)
remains non-negative for all values of P [H ]— while the expected payment Rij does go to zero as P [H ] tends
to 1 (i.e., in the limit of vanishing uncertainty as the underlying ground truth is more and more likely to
always be H (or always be L)), as long as there is some bound ǫ > 0 such that max{P [H ],P [L]} ≤ 1− ǫ, a
simple calculation can be used to determine a value β∗(ǫ) such that the resulting mechanism with β = β∗
leads to nonnegative utilities for all agents in the full-effort truth-telling Nash equilibrium of M.
4.2 Equilibrium analysis
We now analyze the equilibria of Md. Throughout, we index the tasks J(i) corresponding to agent i by
j ∈ {1, . . . , D}.
First, to illustrate the idea behind the mechanism, we prove the simpler result that [(1, X)] is an equi-
librium of M when agents all have equal proficiency pi = p, and are restricted to choosing one common
strategy for all their tasks.
Proposition 3. Suppose all agents have the same maximum proficiency p, and are restricted to choosing
the same strategy for each of their tasks. Then, all agents choosing [(1, X)] is an equilibrium of Md for all
d, if p 6= 1/2.
Proof. Consider an agent i, and suppose all other agents use the strategy (1, X) on all their tasks. As
discussed in the preliminaries, an agent’s reward is linear in her reports fixing the strategies of other agents,
so it will be enough to show that there is no beneficial deviation to (1, Xc), or (0, r) for any r ∈ [0, 1] to
establish an equilibrium. (as noted earlier, the choice of effort level is irrelevant when reportingXij according
to a the outcome of a random coin toss independent of the observed value of Xij). The reward to agent i
when she uses strategy [(1, X)] is
E[Ri((1, X))] =
D∑
j=1
E
[
XijXrj(i)j + (1−Xij)(1 −Xrj(i)j)
]
− E
[∑
k∈Sij
Xik
d
∑
l∈Srj(i)j
Xrj(i)l
d
+ (1−
∑
k∈Sij
Xik
d
)(1−
∑
l∈Srj(i)j
Xrj(i)l
d
)]
]
= D
[
p2 + (1− p)2 − (p[H ]2 + (1 − p[H ])2)
]
= D(p− p(H))(p− p(L))
= D(2p− 1)2P [H ]P [L],
which is strictly positive if p 6= 1/2 and min(P [H ],P [L]) > 0 (as assumed throughout), where we use
p− p[H ] = (2p− 1)P [L] and p− p[L] = (2p− 1)P [H ]. The expected reward from deviating to (1, Xc), when
other agents are using (1, X) is
E[Ri((1, X
c))] = D (2p(1− p)− 2p[H ](1− p[H ])) = −D(p− p(H))(p− p(L)).
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Therefore, the expected reward from deviating to (1, Xc) is negative and strictly smaller than the reward
from (1, X) if p 6= 1/2. Finally, suppose agent i deviates to playing (0, r), i.e., reporting the outcome of a
random coin toss with bias r as her evaluation of Xij . Her expected reward from using this strategy when
other agents play according to (1, X) is
E[Ri((0, r))] = D (rp[H ] + (1 − r)p[H ]− (rp[H ] + (1− r)(1 − p[H ]))) = 0.
(In fact, if either agent reports ratings on her tasks by tossing a random coin with any probability r ∈ [0, 1],
independent of the underlying true realization of Xij , the expected reward to agent i is 0.) Therefore, if
p 6= 1/2, deviating from (1, X) leads to a strict decrease in reward to agent i. Hence, the rewards Rij can
always be scaled appropriately to ensure that [(1, X)] is an equilibrium of M for any values of the costs
ci.
We will now move on to proving our main equilibrium result for Md, where agents can have different
maximum proficiencies, as well as possibly use different strategies for different tasks. We begin with a
technical lemma and a definition.
Lemma 4. Let fα(p, q) = pq + (1 − p)(1 − q) − α(p[H ]q[H ] + (1 − p[H ])(1 − q[H ])). If α ≤ 1, (i) fα(p, q)
is strictly increasing in p if q > 1/2, and strictly increasing in q if p > 1/2. (ii) fα(p, q) is nonnegative if
p, q ≥ 1/2, and positive if p, q > 1/2. (iii) Denote f(p, q) , f1(p, q). Then, f(p, q) = f(q, p) = f(1−p, 1−q).
Also f(p, 1− q) = f(1− p, q) = −f(p, q).
Proof. Recall that p[H ] = pP [H ] + (1 − p)P [L], and similarly for q[H ].
fα(p, q) = p(2q − 1) + (1− q)− α(pP [H ] + (1− p)P [L])(2q[H ]− 1) − (1− q[H ])
= p [(2q − 1)− α(P [H ]− P [L])(2q[H ]− 1)] +K−p
= p(2q − 1)(1− α(P [H ]− P [L])2) +K−p,
where K−p is a term that does not depend on p, and we use 2q[H ]− 1 = (2q − 1)(P [H ]−P [L]) in the last
step.
Note that P [H ]− P [L] < P [H ] < 1 if max(P [H ],P [L]) < 1, so that 1 − α(P [H ] − P [L])2 > 0 if α ≤ 1.
Therefore, fα(p, q) is linear in p with strictly positive coefficient when q > 1/2 and α ≤ 1. An identical
argument can be used for q since fα(p, q) can be written as a linear function of q exactly as for p:
fα(p, q) = q(2p− 1)(1− α(P [H ]− P [L])
2) +K−q.
This proves the first claim.
For nonnegativity of fα(p, q) on p ∈ [1/2, 1], we simply argue that f1(p, q) is increasing in q when
p ∈ [1/2, 1], and 0 at q = 1/2. So for any q > 1/2, f1(p, q) ≥ 0 for any p ∈ [1/2, 1]. But fα(p, q) is decreasing
in α, so fα(p, q) is nonnegative for any α ≤ 1 as well.
The final claims about f(p, q) and f(1− p, q) can be verified just by substituting the definitions of p[H ]
and q[H ] and from symmetry in p and q.
Definition 5 (Tij , dij). Let Tij be the set of all tasks j
′ 6= j such that j ∈ Sij′ , i.e., Tij is the set of tasks
j′ for which i’s report on task j is used to compute the statistic term of i’s reward Rij′ for task j
′. We use
dij = |Tij | to denote the number of such tasks j′.
Our main equilibrium result states that under a mild set of conditions on the choice of reference raters
rj(i) and sets Tij , exerting full effort and reporting truthfully on all tasks is an equilibrium of Md— even
when agents have different maximum proficiencies and can choose a different strategy for each task (for
instance, an agent could choose to shirk effort on some tasks and put in effort on the others). The main
idea behind this result can be understood from the proof of Proposition p-easy above, where all agents had
the same maximum proficiency pi = p and were restricted to using the same strategy for each task. There,
the expected payoff from using [(1, X)] is exactly f(p, p) where f is as defined in Lemma 4, while the payoff
from playing [(0, r)] is 0 (independent of other agents’ strategies); the payoff from deviating to [(1, Xc)] when
other agents play [(1, X)] is −f(p, p). Since f(p, p) > 0 for p > 1/2 and increases with p, it is a best response
for every agent to attain maximum proficiency and truthfully report her evaluation.
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Extending the argument when agents can have both different maximum proficiencies pi and use different
strategy choices for each task requires more care, and are what necessitate the conditions on the task
assignment in Theorem 6 below. We note that these conditions onMd arise because of the generalization to
both differing abilities pi and being allowed to choose a different strategy for each task— if either generalization
is waived, i.e., if agents can choose different strategies per task but all have equal ability (pi = p), or agents
can have different abilities pi but are restricted to choosing the same strategy for all their tasks, [(1, X)] can
be shown to be an equilibrium of Md even without imposing these conditions.
Theorem 6. Suppose pi > 1/2 for all i, and for each agent i, for each task j ∈ J(i), (i) dij = d, and (ii)
E[prj(i)] = Ejl∈Tij [prjl (i)] , p¯i, where the expectation is over the randomness in the assignment of reference
raters to tasks and the sets Tij. Then, [(1, X)] is an equilibrium of Md.
The first condition in Theorem 6, dij = d, says that each task j performed by an agent i must contribute
to computing the reward via the statistic term for exactly d other tasks in J(i), where d is the number
of reports used to compute the ‘empirical frequency’ of H reports by i in the statistic term. The second
condition E[prj(i)] = Ejl∈Tij [prjl (i)] says that an agent i should expect the average proficiency of her reference
rater rj(i) to be equal for all the tasks that she performs, i.e., agent i should not be able to identify any
particular task where her reference raters are, on average, worse than the reference raters for her other tasks
(intuitively, this can lead to agent i shirking effort on this task being a profitable deviation). The first
condition holds for each of the two specific mechanisms M1 and MD−1, and the second condition can be
satisfied, essentially, by a randomization of the agents before assignment, as described in §5. We now prove
the result.
Proof. Consider agent i, and suppose all other agents use strategy [(1, X)], i.e., put in full effort with
truthtelling on all their tasks. It will be enough to consider pure strategy deviations, and show that there is
no beneficial deviation to (1, Xc), or (0, r) for any r ∈ [0, 1] on any single task or subset of tasks.
First, consider a particular assignment of reference raters rj(i) and the sets Sij (and therefore Tij). The
total expected reward to agent i from all her D tasks in this assignment, when other agents all play according
to [(1, X)] is
E[Ri] =
D∑
j=1
E[XijXrj (i)j + (1−Xij)(1−Xrj (i)j)]−
[∑
k∈Sij
E[Xik]
d
prj(i)[H ] + (1−
∑
k∈Sij
E[Xik]
d
)(1− prj(i)[H ])
]
=
D∑
j=1
E[XijXrj (i)j + (1−Xij)(1−Xrj(i)j)]−
[∑
k∈Sij
E[Xik]
d
(2prj(i)[H ]− 1) + (1− prj(i)[H ])
]
=
D∑
j=1
[
E
[
XijXrj(i)j + (1−Xij)(1−Xrj (i)j)
]
−
∑
jl∈Tij
(
E[Xij ]
d
(2prjl (i)
[H ]− 1)
)
− (1− prj(i)[H ])
]
,
where the expectation is over any randomness in the strategy of i as well as randomness in i and rj(i)’s
evaluations for each task j, and we rearrange to collect Xij terms in the last step.
Now, agent i can receive different reference raters and task sets Sij in different assignments. So to
compute her expected reward, agent i will also take an expectation over the randomness in the assignment
of reference raters to tasks and the sets Sij , which appear in the summation above via Tij .
Recall the condition that E[prj(i)] = Ejl∈Tij [prjl (i)] , p¯i. Using this condition and taking the expectation
over the randomness in the assignments of rj(i) and Sij , the expected reward of i is
E[Ri] =
D∑
j=1
[
E
[
XijXrj(i)j + (1−Xij)(1−Xrj(i)j)
]
−
∑
jl∈Tij
(
E[Xij ]
d
(2p¯i[H ]− 1)
)
− (1− p¯i[H ])
]
=
D∑
j=1
[
E
[
XijXrj(i)j + (1−Xij)(1−Xrj(i)j)
]
−
dij
d
E[Xij ](2p¯i[H ]− 1)− (1− p¯i[H ])
]
,
where p¯i[H ] = E[prj(i)[H ]] = Ejl∈Tij [prjl (i)[H ]].
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The expected reward to agent i, when she makes evaluations with proficiency qj for task j and truthfully
reports these evaluations (Xij = Xˆij), is then
E[Ri] =
D∑
j=1
[
qj p¯i + (1− qj)(1− p¯i)−
dij
d
qj [H ](2p¯i[H ]− 1)− (1− p¯i[H ])
]
=
D∑
j=1
[
qj p¯i + (1− qj)(1− p¯i)−
dij
d
(qj [H ]p¯i[H ] + (1− q[H ])(1− p¯i[H ]))− (1−
dij
d
)(1− p¯i[H ])
]
=
D∑
j=1
[
f dij
d
(qj , p¯i) + (
dij
d
− 1)(1− p¯i[H ])
]
. (3)
where the expectation is taken over randomness in all agents’ evaluations, as well as over randomness in
the choices of rj(i) and Sij .
We can now show that choosing full effort and truthtelling on all tasks is a best response when all other
agents use [(1, X)] if dij = d. First, by Lemma 4, f dij
d
(qj , p¯i) is increasing in qj provided
dij
d
≤ 1, so agent
i should choose full effort to achieve her maximum proficiency pi on all tasks. Next, note that in terms
of the expected reward, using proficiency qj and reporting X
c is equivalent to using proficiency 1 − qj and
reporting X . So again by Lemma 4, deviating to Xc, i.e., (1 − qj), on any task is strictly dominated by X
for qj > 1/2 and p¯i > 1/2.
Finally, if agent i chooses fij as the function which reports the outcome of a random cointoss with
probability r of H for any task j, the component of E[Ri] contributed by the term corresponding to Xij
becomes
E
[
XijXrj(i)j + (1−Xij)(1−Xrj(i)j)
]
−
dij
d
(
E[Xij ]prj(i)[H ] + (1−E[Xij ])(1− prj(i)[H ])
)
= rprj(i)[H ] + (1− r)(1− prj(i)[H ])− (rprj(i)[H ] + (1− r)(1− prj(i)[H ])))
= 0,
which is strictly smaller than the reward from fij = X in (3) if qj > 1/2 and
dij
d
≥ 1, since f(qj , p¯i) is
strictly positive when qj , p¯i > 1/2 by Lemma 4.
Since we need
dij
d
≤ 1 to ensure that (1, Xc) is not a profitable deviation, and dij
d
≥ 1 to ensure that
(0, r) is not a profitable deviation, requiring dij = d simultaneously satisfies both conditions. Therefore, if
dij = d, deviating from (1, X) on any task j leads to a strict decrease in reward to agent i. Since the total
reward to agent i can be decomposed into the sum of D terms which each depend only on the report Xij
and therefore the strategy for the single task j, any deviation from [(1, X)] for any single task or subset of
tasks strictly decreases i’s expected reward.
Therefore, the rewards Ri =
∑
j∈J(i) Rij can always be scaled appropriately to ensure that [(1, X)] is an
equilibrium of Md.
Other equilibria. While [(1, X)] is an equilibrium,Md can have other equilibria as well— for instance, the
strategy [(0, r)], where all agents report the outcome of a random cointoss with bias r on each task, is also
an equilibrium of Md for all r ∈ [0, 1], albeit with 0 reward to each agent. In fact, as we show in the next
theorem, no equilibrium, symmetric or asymmetric, in pure or mixed strategies, can yield higher reward6
to agents than [(1, X)], as long as agents ‘treat tasks equally’ (for example, while an agent may choose to
shirk effort on one task and work on all others, each of her tasks is equally likely to be the one she shirks
on). We will refer to this as tasks being ‘apriori equivalent’, so that agents cannot distinguish between tasks
prior to putting in effort on them (or equivalently, the assignment of reference raters is such that agents
will not find it beneficial (in terms of expected reward) to use a different strategy for a specific task). Note
that this assumption is particularly reasonable in the context of applications where agents are recruited for
a collection of similar tasks as in crowdsourced abuse/adult content identification, or in peer grading where
each task is an anonymous student’s solution to the same problem.
6 We note that another equilibrium which achieves the same maximum expected reward is [(1, Xc)], where all agents put
in full effort to make their evaluations, but then all invert their evaluations for their reports. However, [(1, Xc)] is a rather
unnatural, and risky, strategy, and one that is unlikely to arise in practice. Also, as we will see later, [(1, Xc)] can also lead to
lower rewards when there are some agents who always report truthfully.
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Theorem 7. Suppose pi > 1/2, and tasks are apriori equivalent. Then, the equilibrium where all agents
choose [(1, X)] yields maximum reward to each agent.
Proof. Consider a particular agent i and task j, and a single potential reference rater rj(i) for (i, j). Recall
from the preliminaries that agent i’s choice of fij can be described via a matrix M = α1MX + α2MXc +
α3MH + α4ML, and that we denote i’s evaluation via a vector o, where o = [1 0]
T if i observes H and
o = [0 1]T if i observes L. Similarly, let us describe rj(i)’s choice of reporting function via the matrix M
′
with corresponding coefficients α′i, and denote rj(i)’s evaluation by o
′.
Since tasks are apriori equivalent, each player i (hence rj(i) too) uses strategies such that E[Xij ] = E[Xik]
for all j, k ∈ J(i). Then, we can rewrite the expected reward for agent i on task j, when paired with reference
rater rj(i), as
E[Rij ] = 2(E[XijXrj(i)j ]− E[Xij ]E[Xrj (i)j ]).
Using the matrix-vector representation, substituting M,M ′ with their representations in terms of the basis
matrices and expanding, and evaluating the matrix-matrix products, we have
XijXrj(i)j = o
′TM ′TMo = o′TRMo,
where
RM = (α1α
′
1 + α2α
′
2)I + α2α
′
1MXc + α1α
′
2M
T
Xc + (α3α
′
3 + α4α
′
4)1+ (α3α
′
1 + α4α
′
2)MH + (α1α
′
3 + α2α
′
4)M
T
H
+ (α4α
′
1 + α3α
′
2)ML + (α1α
′
4 + α2α
′
3)M
T
L ,
and I,1 denote the identity matrix and the matrix of all ones in R2×2 respectively, and we use MTXMX =
MTXcMXc = I, M
T
HMH = M
T
LML = 1, M
T
XcMH = ML, M
T
XcML = MH , and M
T
HML = 0. Similarly,
E[Xij ]E[Xrj(i)j ] = E[o
′TM ′T ]E[Mo] = E[o′T ]RME[o],
where RM is as defined above.
Now, note thatMHo = [o1+o2 0]
T = [1 0]T since o1+o2 = 1 for any evaluation vector o by definition,
so that E[o′TMHo] = E[o
′T ]E[MHo], since MHo is a constant. The same is the case for each of the terms
E[o′T1o], E[o′TMTHo], E[o
′TMTL o], E[o
′TMLo]. Therefore, these terms cancel out when taking the difference
E[XijXrj(i)j ] − E[Xij ]E[Xrj(i)j ] (corresponding to the reward from either agent choosing to report Xij
independent of her evaluation being 0). Also note that E[oij ] =
[
p[H ] p[L]
]T
if agent i makes evaluations
with proficiency p. Suppose the agents use effort leading to proficiencies p and p′ respectively. Then, we
have
E[XijXrj(i)j ]− E[Xij ]E[Xrj(i)j ] = (α1α
′
1 + α2α
′
2)(E[o
′T o]− E[o′]TE[o]) + α2α
′
1(E[o
′TMXco]− E[o
′T ]MXcE[o])
+ α1α
′
2(E[o
′TMTXco]− E[o
′T ]MTXcE[o])
= (α1α
′
1 + α2α
′
2)(E[o
′
1o1 + o2o
′
2]− E[o
′
1]E[o1]− E[o2]E[o
′
2])
+ (α2α
′
1 + α1α
′
2)(E[o
′
1o2 + o1o
′
2]− E[o
′
1]E[o2]− E[o1]E[o
′
2])
= (α1α
′
1 + α2α
′
2)
(
pp′ + (1− p)(1− p′)− p[H ]p′[H ]−
(1− p[H ])(1− p′[H ])
)
+ (α2α
′
1 + α1α
′
2)
(
p(1− p′) +
(1− p)p′ − p[H ](1− p′[H ])− (1− p[H ])p′[H ]
)
.
Now, note that multiplier of (α1α
′
1+α2α
′
2) is precisely f(p, p
′), which by Lemma 4 is nonnegative if p, p′ ≥ 1/2,
and strictly positive if p, p′ > 1/2. Also, for p, p′ ≥ 1/2, note that p[H ] ≤ p and p′[H ] ≤ p′. Now, the function
g(x, y) = x(1−y)+y(1−x) is decreasing in both x and y for x, y ∈ [ 12 , 1] (taking derivatives), so the multiplier
of (α2α
′
1 + α1α
′
2) is non-positive, and negative if p, p
′ > 1/2.
So the maximum value that E[XijXrj(i)j ] − E[Xij ]E[Xrj(i)j ] can take for nonnegative coefficients with∑
αi =
∑
α′i = 1, is f(p, p
′), which is obtained by setting α3 = α4 = 0, α
′
3 = α
′
4 = 0 (i.e., with no weight on
random independent reporting), and a1 = α
′
1 = 1, α2 = α
′
2 = 0 (or viceversa): this is because the maximum
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value of term (α1α
′
1+α2α
′
2) when α2 = 1−α1 and α
′
2 = 1−α
′
1 is 1 and is achieved with these values, which
also minimize the value of the term (α2α
′
1+α1α
′
2) with the non-positive multiplier, since (α2α
′
1+α1α
′
2) ≥ 0
and is equal to 0 for these values of αi, α
′
i. Also, since f(p, p
′) increases with increasing p and p′, it is
maximized when agents put in full effort and achieve their maximum proficiencies pi, prj(i).
Therefore the expected reward for the single component of E[Rij ] coming from a specific reference rater
achieves its upper bound when both agents use [(1, X)]. The same argument applies for each reference rater,
and therefore to the expected reward E[Rij ], and establishes the claim.
We next investigate what kinds of Nash equilibria might exist where agents use low effort with any positive
probability. Apriori, it is reasonable to expect that there would be mixed-strategy equilibria where agents
randomize between working and shirking, i.e., put in effort (choose eij = 1) sometimes and not (choose
eij = 0) some other times. However, we next show that as long as tasks are apriori equivalent and agents
only randomize between reporting truthfully and reporting the outcome of an independent random cointoss
(i.e., they do not invert evaluations), the only equilibrium in which any agent uses any support on (0, r) is
the one in which all agents always use (0, r) on all their tasks. To show this, we start with the following
useful lemma saying that an agent who uses a low-effort strategy any fraction of the time will always have
a beneficial deviation as long as some reference agent plays (1, X) with some positive probability. Roughly
speaking, this is because as long as there is some probability that an agent’s reference rater plays (1, X)
rather than (0, r), the agent strictly benefits by always playing (1, X) to maximize the probability of both
agents playing (1, X), which is the only time the agent obtains a positive reward.
Lemma 8. Suppose the probability of agent i using strategy (1, X) is δ and strategy (0, ri) is 1− δ for each
task j ∈ J(i). Suppose i’s potential reference raters rj(i) use strategies (1, X) and (0, rrj(i)) with probabilities
ǫrj(i) and 1 − ǫrj(i) respectively, for each task j ∈ J(i). If ǫrj(i) > 0 for any reference rater with proficiency
prj(i) > 1/2, then agent i has a (strict) profitable deviation to δ
′ = 1, i.e., to always using strategy (1, X),
for all values of ri ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. Consider a particular task j, and let k = 1, . . . ,K be the potential reference rater for (i, j). Let ak
denote the probability that k is the reference rater for agent i for task j. By linearity of expectation, i’s
expected reward for j can be written as
E[Rij ] =
K∑
k=1
ak
[
δǫk(pipk + (1− pi)(1− pk)− (pi[H ]pk[H ] + (1− pi[H ])(1− pk)))
+ (1− δ)ǫk(ripk[H ] + (1− ri)(1− pk[H ])− (ripk[H ] + (1− ri)(1− pk)))
+ δ(1− ǫk)(pi[H ]rk + (1− pi[H ])(1− rk)− (pi[H ]rk + (1− pi[H ])(1− rk)))
+ (1− δ)(1− ǫk)(rirk + (1− ri)(1− rk)− (rirk + (1− ri)(1− rk)))
]
= δ
∑
k
akǫk(pipk + (1− pi)(1− pk)− (pi[H ]pk[H ] + (1− pi[H ])(1− pk[H ])))
= δ
∑
k
akǫkf1(pi, pk).
Now, E[Rij ] is linear in δ, and by Lemma 4, the coefficient of δ is nonnegative for all ǫk and pk ≥ 1/2, and
strictly greater than 0 if ǫk > 0 for some k with pk > 1/2. Therefore, i can strictly increase her expected
reward E[Rij ] by increasing δ for any δ < 1, as long as there is some reference agent k with ǫk > 0 and
pk > 1/2.
The same argument holds for each task j ∈ J(i), and therefore to strictly improve i’s total reward E[Ri],
we only need one reference rater across all tasks to satisfy ǫk > 0 and pk > 1/2 to obtain a strictly beneficial
deviation (recall that we assumed pi ≥ 1/2 for all i).
This lemma immediately allows us to show that the only low-effort equilibria of M that we reasonably7
need to be concerned about is the pure-strategy equilibrium in which eij = 0 for all i, j. Note that different
agents could use different ri (or even rij) in such equilibria, but all agents will receive reward 0 in all such
equilibria.
7(We say reasonably because of the technical possibility of equilibria where some agents mix over (1, Xc) as well.)
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Theorem 9. Suppose every agent can be a reference rater with some non-zero probability for every other
agent, and tasks are apriori equivalent. Then, the only equilibria (symmetric or asymmetric) in which agents
mix between (1, X) and any low-effort strategy [(0, rij)] with non-trivial support on [(0, rij)] are those where
all agents always use low effort on all tasks.
Eliminating low-effort equilibria. Our final result uses Lemma 8 to obtain a result about eliminating
low-effort equilibria. Suppose there are some trusted agents (for example, an instructor or TA in the peer-
grading context or workers with long histories of accurate evaluations or good performance in crowdsourcing
platforms) who always report truthfully with proficiency t > 1/2. Let ǫt denote the minimum probability,
over all agents i, that the reference rater for agent i is such a trusted agent (note that we can ensure ǫt > 0
by having the trusted agent randomly choose each task with positive probability). Lemma 8 immediately
gives us the following result for Md, arising from the fact that the reward from playing a random strategy
(0, r) is exactly 0—the presence of trusted agents with a non-zero probability, however small, is enough to
eliminate low-effort equilibria altogether.
Theorem 10. Suppose ǫt > 0. Then [(0, rij)] is not an equilibrium of M for any rij ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. Suppose all agents except the trusted agent use the strategy (0, rij), and ǫt is the probability that
the trusted agent is the reference rater for any agent-task pair. Then, since agent i reports Xij according to
a random coin toss independent of the actual realization of j, the payoff from any reference rater, whether
the trusted agent or another agent playing (0, r) is 0. For notational simplicity, let r = rij , r
′ = rrj(i)j .
E[Rij ] = ǫt(rt[H ] + (1− r)(1− t[H ])− (rt[H ] + (1− r)(1− t[H ]))
+ (1− ǫt)(rr
′ + (1− r)(1− r′)− (rr′ + (1− r)(1− r′)))
= 0.
By deviating to (1, X), agent i can strictly improve her payoff as long as ǫt > 0 and t, p > 1/2, since her
expected reward from this deviation is
E[Rij ] = ǫt(pt+ (1− p)(1− t)− (p[H ]t[H ] + (1− p[H ])(1− t[H ]))
+ (1− ǫt)(rr
′ + (1− r)(1− r′)− (rr′ + (1− r)(1− r′))
> 0,
since the coefficient of ǫt is positive for t, p > 1/2 by Lemma 4. Therefore, there is a strictly beneficial
deviation to (1, X), so there is a choice of multiplier for the reward such that the payoff to agent i, which
is the difference between the reward and the cost of effort c, is strictly positive as well. So (0, rij) is not an
equilibrium of M when ǫt > 0.
This result, while simple, is fairly strong: as long as some positive fraction of the population can be
trusted to always report truthfully with proficiency greater than 1/2, the only reasonable8 equilibrium ofM
is the high-effort equilibrium [(1, X)], no matter how small this fraction. In particular, note that M does
not need to assign a higher reward for agreement with a trusted agent to achieve this result, and therefore
does not need to know the identity of the trusted agents. In contrast, the mechanism which rewards agents
for agreement with a reference rater without subtracting out our statistic term must use a higher reward
w(ǫt) for agreement with the trusted agents which increases as
1
ǫt
to eliminate low-effort equilibria9— this,
in addition to being undesirably large, also requires identification of trusted agents.
5 Creating the Task Assignment
While in some crowdsourcing settings, agents choose tasks at will, there are also applications where a principal
can potentially choose an assignment of a collection of her tasks among some assembled pool of workers. In
8Again, we say reasonable rather than unique because (1, Xc) does remain an equilibrium of M for all ǫt less than a
threshold value— however, in addition to being an unnatural and risky strategy, this equilibrium yields strictly smaller payoffs
than [(1, X)] when ǫt > 0. Note also that the introduction of such trusted agents does not introduce new equilibria, and that
[(1, X)] remains an equilibrium of M.)
9The same is the case for a mechanism based on rewarding for the ‘right’ variance, which does retain [(1, X)] as a maximum
reward equilibrium, but still requires identifying the trusted agents and rewarding extra for agreement with them.
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this section, we present a simple algorithm to design assignment of tasks to agents such we can satisfy the
condition in Theorem 6 for mechanism MD−1, i.e., when d = D − 1. We note that with this assignment
of tasks to agents, choosing reference raters appropriately is trivially feasible for d = 1, i.e., for M1, and
ensuring dij = d is also easy as described in §3.
We start out by randomly permuting all agents using a permutation π. For simplicity of presentation we
assume that m
D
(= n
T
) is an integer. The m tasks are divided into m
D
task-blocks, each containing D tasks.
Similarly, the n agents are divided into T agent blocks, each containing n
T
agents. We number the task-blocks
by b = 1, . . . , m
D
and the agent blocks by a = 1, . . . , T . The agents in block a are thus (a− 1) n
T
+ 1, . . . , a n
T
and the tasks in block b are (b− 1)D + 1, . . . , bD.
We first describe the algorithm and then show that it produces an assignment that satisfies the conditions
required in the definition of MD−1, in particular that for each agent-task pair, it is possible to choose a
reference rater who has only that task in common with this agent. The algorithm works as follows: we
assign tasks for agents starting from the agent block a = 1 onwards. For block 1, each agent i′ in the block
is assigned all the tasks corresponding to the task block i′ (recall that number of agents in a block equals
n
T
= m
D
, the number of task-blocks). This completes fills up the capacity of the agents in block 1. For blocks
a = 2, . . . , T , consecutively, the agent (a − 1) n
T
+ i′ is assigned D tasks {i′, i′ + m
D
, . . . , i′ + m
D
(D − 1)}, for
i′ = 1, . . . , n
T
.
The above assignment completely describes the sets J(i) and I(j) for every agent i and task j. For each
task j, let i∗j denote the unique agent in block 1 who works on task j. We define the reference raters as
follows: for each agent-task pair (i, j), if i lies in blocks {2, . . . , T }, define the reference rater rj(i) = i∗j . If
i lies in block 1, define the reference rater to be any other user who is working on this task. Note that for
d = D − 1, the sets Sij and Srj(i)j are exactly Sij = J(i) \ {j} and Srj(i)j = J(rj(i)) \ {j}.
The following lemma proves two things— first, the assignment above is actually feasible under fairly mild
conditions, and second, that the choice of reference raters satisfies the conditions in the definition of M and
those required by Theorem 6.
Lemma 11. If m ≥ D2, the above algorithm generates a feasible assignment, i.e. every agent is assigned
exactly D tasks and every task to T agents. Also, for agent-task pair (i, j), the reference rater rj(i) satisfies
J(rj(i)) ∩ J(i) = {j}. Furthermore, E[prj(i)] = Ejl∈Tij [pi′jl
].
Proof. Agents in block 1 are clearly assigned to their full capacity. For blocks a = 2, . . . , T , for every agent
i = (a− 1) n
T
+ i′, the set I(i) = {i′, i′+ m
D
, . . . , i′+ m
D
(D− 1)}. Note that for each i, the above values are all
distinct, and that i′+ m
D
(D− 1) ≤ n
T
+ m
D
(D− 1) = m. Thus every agent’s assignment is feasible. Since the
total capacity of agents equals the total capacity of the tasks, the tasks are also assigned completely, and to
distinct agents.
In order to see that the choice of reference raters is feasible, note that if D2 ≤ m, then m
D
≥ D, and
hence the tasks for each agent belong to distinct blocks. For agent-task pairs (i, j) where the agents are in
blocks 2, . . . , T , the reference rater rj(i) = i
∗
j , the unique agent in block 1 who worked only on the task-block
that j belongs to. By the above argument, i does not work on any other task from this block, and hence
J(i∗j ) ∩ J(i) = {j}. By the same argument, i is also a feasible reference rater for i
∗
j on task j. Thus, the
choice of reference raters satisfies the condition for MD−1.
Finally, the expectation condition follows simply from the random permutation applied to the set of
agents at the beginning of the construction.
6 Discussion
In this paper, we introduced the problem of information elicitation when agents’ proficiencies are endoge-
nously determined as a function of their effort, and presented a simple mechanism which uses the presence
of multiple tasks to identify and penalize low-effort agreement to incentivize effort when tasks have binary
types. Our mechanism has the property that maximum effort followed by truthful reporting is the Nash
equilibrium with maximum payoff to all agents, including mixed strategy equilibria. In addition to handling
endogenous agent proficiencies, to the best of our knowledge this is the first mechanism for information
elicitation with this ’best Nash equilibrium’ property over all pure and over mixed strategy equilibria that
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requires agents to only report their own evaluations (i.e., without requiring ‘prediction’ reports of their
beliefs about other agents’ reports), and does not impose any requirement on a diverging number of agent
reports per task to achieve its incentive properties. Our mechanism provides a starting point for designing
information elicitation mechanisms for several crowdsourcing settings where proficiency is an endogenous,
effort-dependent choice, such as image labeling, tagging, and peer grading in online education.
We use the simplest possible model that captures the complexities arising from strategically determined
agent proficiencies, leading to a number of immediate directions for further work. First, our underlying out-
come space is binary (H or L)— modeling and extending the mechanism to allow a richer space of outcomes
and feedback is one of the most immediate and challenging directions for further work. Also, our model of
effort is binary, where agents either exert full effort and achieve maximum proficiency, or exert no effort to
achieve the baseline proficiency. While our results extend to a model where proficiency increases linearly
with cost, a natural question is how they extend to more general models, for example, with convex costs.
Finally, a very interesting direction is that of heterogenous tasks with task-specific priors and abilities. In
our model, tasks are homogenous with the same prior P [H ], and agents have the same cost and maximum
proficiency for each task. If tasks differ in difficulty, and agents can observe the difficulty of a task prior
to putting in effort, there are clear incentives to shirk on harder tasks while putting in effort for the easier
ones. While tasks are indeed apriori homogenous (or can be partitioned to be so) in some crowdsourcing
settings, there are other applications where some tasks are clearly harder than others; also, agents may
have task-specific abilities. Designing mechanisms with strong incentive properties for this setting is a very
promising and important direction for further work.
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